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Cinema’s Memoropolitics: Hypnotic 
Images, Contingent Pasts, Forgetting
Pasi Väliaho
What makes a medium a medium (as Lorenz Engell phrases it) is 
the medium’s capacity to disclose its own conditions of production 
and experience.1 Media are not just tools or devices with predeter-
mined operative functions, but kinds of re!ective surfaces—acts of 
“dédoublement,” or double re!ections that, more or less, clearly 
and vividly, mirror themselves, including the ways in which they 
come to shape our capacities of becoming cognizant of ourselves 
and the world around us.
This level of self-re!ection is apparent in The Mystery of the 
Rocks of Kador (Le Mystère des roches de Kador), a unique "lm on cin-
ema technology, trauma, and memory directed by Léonce Perret 
in 1912. Kador includes one of the most compelling "lm-within-
a-"lm scenes in the early history of cinema, which presents an 
original take on the act of "lm viewing and what it entails psycho-
logically, as well as on the role that cinema has played in modifying 
the modern psyche more generally speaking (see "gure 1a, 1c–d). 
While self-re!ective scenes where cinema "lmed itself, so to speak, 
revealing its conditions of showing and experience, were not lack-
ing in the early cinema period (quite the contrary), what distin-
guishes Kador is the particular position it imagines for cinema in 
psychological treatment and the picture of memory, trauma, and 
subjectivity it draws.
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Figure 1a. Phone book.
Figure 1b. Play of light and 
shadow.
Figure 1c. Hypnotic circuit.
Figure 1d. Screen of forget-
ting. From The Mystery of the 
Rocks of Kador, dir. Léonce 
Perret (Gaumont, 1912).
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The "lm’s story line immerses the viewer in a psychologi-
cal drama of con!icting desires, motivations, and actions, which 
revolve around the protagonist Suzanne de Lormel (played 
by Suzanne Grandais), who has just recently become heir of an 
immense fortune. Underage, she is appointed a guardian, her 
cousin Fernand de Keranic (played by Léonce Perret himself). 
When Suzanne approaches the age of inheritance, she falls in love 
with Captain Jean d’Erquy (Emile Keppens), yet at the same time 
Fernand is hoping to marry her mainly in order to get his hands to 
the fortune and clear his own heavy debts. His marriage proposal 
refused, Fernand reverts to a clause in Suzanne’s uncle’s testament, 
which states that should Suzanne die or “enter the convent, or be 
struck by serious illness, such as blindness or insanity,” Fernand 
himself would become the sole heir. So Fernand concocts a plan: 
he arranges for the two lovers to come on a beach beneath the 
Rocks of Kador (rugged, cliffy seashore located in Brittany), drugs 
Suzanne, who passes out, and shoots Jean. Miraculously, Jean, who 
is wounded, is able to drag Suzanne onto a rowboat before the 
!ood comes in, and they are left drifting in the sea. At some point, 
Suzanne awakes and "nds herself in this desperate situation, howl-
ing in despair, apparently believing that Jean is dead. The next 
morning, the couple is rescued by local "shermen, but Suzanne 
has undergone a total change of personality. The previously cheer-
ful, sparkling young woman has fallen into what resembles a cata-
tonic state: she is almost completely inactive and doesn’t seem to 
understand speech, let alone speak herself. There is no sign that 
she possesses any memories of the past; rather, she appears like an 
automaton who is closed off from personal experience, endowed 
with only a very rudimentary consciousness and possessed by 
involuntary bodily movements such as the nervous tic that haunts 
Suzanne’s left eye and cheek.
The word automaton indeed comes across as pertinent in this 
context because it was one of the key notions used to describe 
mental disturbances in psychological discourses at the turn of the 
twentieth century. A notable psychologist of his times in France, 
Pierre Janet, for instance, coined the concept of psychological autom-
atism to unearth a realm of intertwined dissociated mental states, 
ranging from somnambulism and catalepsy to what would today 
be called multiple personality disorder. The concept was to make 
sense of regular and predetermined mental phenomena that had 
become detached from personal consciousness, were lacking per-
sonality’s sense of self, and were in essence related to disturbances 
of memory, as Janet stressed: “Phenomena of memory are perhaps 
the most important for our psychological organization, and even 
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their slightest modi"cations have considerable repercussions in 
our life.”2
After the shooting incident, Suzanne appears, above all, as 
amnesiac. A culminating point in The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador 
occurs when a certain Professor Williams is called in to apply 
his new cinema-based therapeutic method in the treatment of 
Suzanne, and when Suzanne is made to watch a "lm that lets her 
(re)experience the traumatic shooting incident. This is the point 
where Kador turns into a philosophically informed articulation of 
cinema and subjectivity in modernity, which I wish to analyze in 
what follows.3 My concern will be how the cinematic medium con-
nected with new models for thinking of who we are and what con-
stitutes us as individual bodies and persons—models that emerged 
in new dynamic psychological sciences at the turn of the twentieth 
century in particular. The focus will be on the sayabilities and vis-
ibilities through which subjectivity became knowable during that 
period and which were characterized by a model or, perhaps better 
put, an emergent diagram of forgetting that then traversed psy-
chological discourses, cinematic forms, scienti"c experiments, and 
so on. By diagram, I mean, following Gilles Deleuze’s reading of 
Michel Foucault, the expression of certain relations of forces that 
shape the social "eld, or a part thereof, at a given moment, a kind 
of “map,” as Deleuze put it, the coordinates and codes of which are 
actualized in the thoughts, gestures, communications, emotions, 
and individuations performing the social.4 The following will be 
an exploration into scienti"c sayabilities and cinematic visibilities 
that, circa 1900, started to predicate subjectivity on temporal and 
contingent processes of remembering and forgetting.
Sciences of Memory ca. 1900
A close-up shot pretty plainly connects Kador with the epistemopol-
itics of psychological sciences and the study of mental pathologies 
at the turn of the twentieth century: a page of a phone book that 
appears in the scene after the shooting incident when Suzanne’s 
"ancé Jean has recovered and returned home (see "gure 1b). 
Jean receives a letter recommending that he should seek advice 
from Professor Williams for the cure of Suzanne, who has just pub-
lished an article about the use of the cinematograph in psycho-
therapy. When the servant opens the phone book for Jean to look 
up the number of Professor Williams’s practice, we are shown an 
impressive list of historical names: Philippe Chaslin, who studied 
pathologies of consciousness; Ernest Dupré, a psychologist famous 
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for his work on compulsive lying; Joseph Grasset, a neurologist 
who was interested in mental pathologies, as well as parapsycho-
logical phenomena; Pierre Janet (whose work will be later treated 
in more detail); neurologist Albert Pitres, who wrote about hyste-
ria, obsessions, and hypnosis; Ernest Séglas, who studied all sorts 
of abnormal mental phenomena, from hallucinations to language 
disorders; and so more.5 As it is from this impressive list of poten-
tial therapists (many of whom in fact studied at the Salpêtrière 
Hospital with Jean-Martin Charcot) that Jean chooses Dr. Pierre 
Williams, the discursive realm within which Kador wishes to situate 
its image of cinema seems rather obvious.
Above all, this was a realm that represented a new way of 
speaking about the soul and emerged in relation to the study of 
traumas and traumatic memories in particular. The word trauma, 
as Ian Hacking reminds us, was used by surgeons and referred to 
bodily wounds before it came to acquire its speci"cally psychologi-
cal meaning.6 Central to modernity’s modes of subjectivity, how-
ever, was the leap of trauma from the body to the psyche, which, 
Hacking argues, was a gradual process that took place at the end 
of the nineteenth century. While the credit for the “psychologiza-
tion” of trauma is often given to Sigmund Freud’s early work on 
neurosis and hysteria, which conceived of these af!ictions as signs 
of repressed memories of seduction and sexual assault, the notion 
of trauma psychologically understood was nonetheless already in 
place before that. In France, an epistemological formation that 
Hacking calls “sciences of memory” had emerged in the 1880s, 
involving a new model of selfhood and personality. This was a 
branch of psychological science that provided the epistemological 
background for the emergence of a speci"c politics of memory in 
modernity, a particular kind of arrangement of power and knowl-
edge that Hacking distinguishes from what Michel Foucault in his 
work analyzed as the realms of the anatomopolitics of the body and 
the biopolitics of populations.7
In the "rst volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault outlined 
how, starting in the seventeenth century, two basic forms of “power 
over life” gradually emerged in the West, which constituted “two 
poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary 
cluster of relations.”8 The "rst one of these was by nature disciplin-
ary and conceived of individual bodies as types of machines the 
capabilities and performance of which needed to be optimized, 
economized, and controlled. The second one, on the other hand, 
focused on what Foucault called “the species body, the body 
imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the 
biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level 
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of health, life expectancy, and longevity, with all the conditions 
that can cause these vary.”9 Rather than aiming at disciplining 
individual bodies, the latter form was to capture and enhance life 
processes on the level of populations by means of statistical knowl-
edge and regulatory policies, for instance. Hacking points out that 
these two forms of power have also had their closely intertwined 
lines of development in the history of psychology, the anatomopol-
itics of the body being related to those branches of psychology that 
have sought to produce knowledge of the mind primarily through 
the anatomy and physiology of the brain, while the biopolitics of 
populations has been yoked with experimental psychology and 
its statistical methods. However, the new dynamic psychological 
sciences of circa 1900 represented a way of conceptualizing the 
subject distinct from the anatomopolitical and biopolitical mod-
els: instead of being occupied with individual brains or the statis-
tical qualities of a population, memoropolitics was interested in 
the psychic life of individuals, which it wrested from religion and 
started to conceptualize in relation to a complex psychology of 
needs, deeds, memories, forgotten traumatic events, and alternat-
ing states of mind.
But how did trauma travel from the body to the soul in the 
late nineteenth century? The answer is, in short, via disturbances 
of memory. Hacking emphasizes that “the background for memo-
ropolitics is pathological forgetting.”10 Forgetting was observed 
"rst of all in cases of physical injury. In the 1870s, French surgeon 
Eugène Azam studied a wide range of head-injury cases (railway 
accidents, blows to the head, etc.) that resulted in various mental 
disorders, ranging from alterations of personality and hallucina-
tions to loss of memory. As Hacking notes, what made Azam’s work 
important was the way in which it signaled amnesia as a new kind 
of object of perception and conceptualization.11 As Azam pointed 
out about head injuries,
There is one thing that dominates all the others: always, or almost always, 
the injured has lost their memory, not only the memory of what has hap-
pened after the accident until they regained consciousness, but the mem-
ory of what had happened during a more or less long period of time that 
preceded the accident.12
What Azam was discovering here was what he called “traumatic 
amnesia” in relation to physical accidents. However, he also 
observed that traumatic amnesias were not necessarily related 
to blows to the head but characterized pathological mental 
states where the individual’s personality would double and even 
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multiply. Félida X was one of the most famous cases that Azam 
studied, which disclosed how one individual could have two dif-
ferent personalities separated by an absence of memory instead 
of being de"ned by a single transcendental ego. Azam noted how 
Félida suffered from periodical alterations between two different 
personalities, both of which had their own continuous chains of 
memories separated by periods of amnesia. Crucially, it seemed 
that the two personalities were largely ignorant of each other, and 
when in one state of personality Félida couldn’t remember what 
she had been doing in the other state.
What we see emerging in Azam’s work is a conception of mem-
ory—and traumatic memory in particular—as a kind of pathogenic 
secret. Allan Young notes that in the nineteenth century traumatic 
memories became considered, on the one hand, “pathogenic” 
because they were “reputed to cause psychiatric disorders” and, 
on the other, “secret” because they were concealed in the sense 
that the subject did not know about their existence (that is, they 
were forgotten).13 Félida X’s case was among the many examples 
of traumatic periodic amnesia that psychologist Théodule Ribot 
cited in his Diseases of Memory (originally published in 1881), a 
book that was perused by Sigmund Freud, Henri Bergson, and 
Pierre Janet, among many others. Ribot’s book is an account of 
memory as something inseparable from the concept of the self (le 
moi, translated in the original English version as “ego”). For Ribot, 
traumatic amnesia as exempli"ed by alternating-personality cases 
disclosed that the self is something transformable, fundamentally 
lacking in identity and "xity.14 In general terms, Ribot argued that 
selfhood needs to be understood as a protean compound of asso-
ciations made between the memorized past and the present state 
of awareness. Whereas self-awareness results from the !uid sen-
sory impressions that form the center of consciousness at a given 
moment, conscious personality is experienced in the continuity of 
this constantly renewing self-awareness with the past. Personality is 
predicated upon the individual’s knowledge of their past, which is 
subject to processes of growth, degeneration, and reproduction as 
memories fade and new ones replace them. Thus, the self, accord-
ing to Ribot, is nourished but also transformed by processes of 
remembering and forgetting:
We arrive, then, at this paradoxical conclusion, that one condition of 
memory is forgetfulness. Without the total obliteration of an immense 
number of states of consciousness, and the momentary repression of many 
more, recollection would be impossible. Forgetfulness, except in certain 
cases, is not a disease of memory, but a condition of health and life.15
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The fundamental idea of the science of memory as articulated by 
Ribot was that memory, and consequently selfhood, is not based 
on unity but is something malleable. The textures of memory and 
sensibility that sustain the subject betray themselves as easily torn. 
“That the ego exists only on the condition of continually changing, 
is an incontestable fact,” Ribot argued.16 Or, as French philosopher 
Alfred Fouillée summarized the ideas of the “new school in psy-
chology” in 1891, “In sum, selfhood is a continuous center of mem-
ories and of motivations attached to these memories; alterations of 
the self can thus be explained in terms of alterations of memory.”17 
Crucially, the subject became fundamentally porous, accidental, 
and contingent, prone to continuous modulations, predicated 
on the fundamental capacity to forget, a capacity that could eas-
ily become a pathogenic cause and origin of altered psychological 
states circumscribing the uncertain boundaries of where one self 
begins and another ends, as we have seen in the case of Félida X 
and the periodic amnesia that separated her different personalities 
from each other.
Forgetting thus became seen as intrinsic to subjectivity, both 
so-called normal and pathological. The fact that we forget also 
made us something that is not one but always already potentially 
many. Fouillée pointed out that the new psychological science of 
memory circa 1900 represented the psyche as a theater where “a 
troupe of very different actors” enacted an interior drama, “each 
of them having a more or less rudimentary personality.”18 It is this 
view of the soul that also informs Suzanne’s character in The Mys-
tery of the Rocks of Kador: a traumatic event instigates pathological 
forgetting, which splits Suzanne’s psyche, whereby elementary psy-
chological automatisms dethrone conscious personality—autom-
atisms that are visibly manifest in tics and involuntary gestures 
that the cinematic image as a particular kind of “somatogram” 
of the soul (to borrow a concept from Stanley Cavell) alone can 
disclose.19 Zooming in on Suzanne’s physical appearance as the 
manifestation of psychic forces out of the ego’s command, the "lm 
teaches us that the self is fundamentally uncertain, something acci-
dental even, and susceptible to modulations through disturbances 
of memory. Seen in this light, it seems that the word “mystery” in 
the title of Perret’s "lm refers primarily to mysteries of memory, 
to concealed, forgotten, and traumatic memories that lead their 
lives within the subject, potentially decomposing and multiplying 
the in-dividual.
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Hypnotic Image
It is within this problematic of pathological forgetting that Kador 
locates the power of cinema over its spectators. Professor Williams’s 
experimental cinematographic method in psychotherapy consists 
in restaging and "lming traumatic events and showing these clips 
to the patient, assuming thereby that modi"cations of the processes 
of remembering and forgetting provide indeed the key to the treat-
ment of maladies of the soul. Nonetheless, very little further insight 
is given in the "lm as to what Professor Williams’s rationale for his 
therapeutic invention is. The only hint we have is the glimpse of a 
dossier that Williams has prepared for the Academy of Medicine 
(“Observations by Professor Williams on the Application of the 
Cinématographe to Psychotherapy”), from which a booklet that 
accompanied the release of Kador highlighted the following extract:
This marvelous invention, used only recently in “mental medicine,” 
seems destined to occupy a prominent place in it very quickly. The lumi-
nous vibrations of cinematographic images, transmitted by means of the 
optic nerve of the retina, are registered on the cells of the cerebral cortex 
and result in a particular state of hypnosis which lends itself admirably 
well to therapeutic suggestion.20
This is all we know about the science behind Professor Williams’s 
approach, yet the description gives us a certain indication of the 
epistemic preoccupations of Williams’s cinema-based psychother-
apy, the key words here being “luminous vibrations,” “particular 
state of hypnosis,” and “therapeutic suggestion.”
If the issues of hypnosis and suggestion appear in Kador as rela-
tively latent and abstract, apprehensible indirectly through visual 
analogies, the notion of “luminous vibrations” becomes tangible in 
the scene in which Suzanne is being treated by Professor Williams. 
Catatonic Suzanne is escorted to the projection room and made 
to sit on a chair: only a single source of light, apparently the white 
screen illuminated by the projector, distinguishes her face from 
the darkness in a visual composition lacking depth and coordinates 
(see "gure 1c). “Behold, Suzanne,” Professor Williams utters, and 
the "lm begins. The next shot shows Suzanne gazing toward the 
cinema screen (see "gure 1d): the external world has receded 
from the "elds of visibility and awareness, and what remains is a 
concentrated luminous circuit between Suzanne and the screen.
This visual play of light and shadow, of luminous vibrations, 
resonates in particular with the notion of “nervous light” that 
Cinema’s Memoropolitics 331
Hippolyte Bernheim used in describing hypnotic induction and 
the mental process of suggestion.21 Bernheim, the leader of the 
Nancy school of psychology in France that was in!uential in 
establishing hypnosis as a recognized psychotherapeutic method, 
understood the psyche as a projection apparatus of sorts, which 
in the waking state casts its light outward and illuminates images 
received through the sensory organs. In the hypnotic state, by con-
trast, internal mental images are illuminated in accordance with 
the suggestions from the hypnotizer. In his treatise on therapeutic 
suggestion from 1888, Bernheim wrote,
The suggested image is a "ctitious image, and . . . answers to no material 
representation in space. . . . The hallucinatory image may be as distinct, 
as bright, and as active to the subject as reality itself, but, borne entirely in 
the subject’s imagination, he sees it as he conceives it, as he interprets it, 
as conscious or unconscious memory brings it up again in the sensorium. 
It is a psychical cerebral image and not a physical one. It does not pass 
by the peripheral apparatus of vision, has no objective reality, follows no 
optical laws, but obeys solely the caprices of the imagination.22
Crucially, Bernheim’s studies of hypnosis and suggestion disclosed 
that even in so-called normal conditions it is not always possible 
to clearly distinguish between imagination and reality, between 
endogenous animations and exogenous imagistic material. We all 
are, Bernheim asserted, exposed to illusions and varying sugges-
tions from others.23 As Debora Silverman observes, Bernheim’s 
work underscored how “energy, visual impressions, and intangible 
forces emanating from the external environment were elements 
as powerful as conscious decision making or assimilation of infor-
mation about the world.”24 Furthermore, striking in Bernheim’s 
writings is the highly visual and even cinematic vocabulary they 
employ: the psyche is populated by images, which can be contagious 
and effectively blur distinctions between the subjective interior and 
the external world. For Stefan Andriopoulos, the language of ner-
vous light and animated images indicates how Bernheim conceived 
of mental processes in anticipated cinematographic terms.25 This 
coincides (in a reverse picture) with The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador, 
which, as noted, gestures toward conceiving cinematographic pro-
cesses and "lm spectatorship in terms of hypnosis and suggestion.
Following this line of thought—that hypnosis in a sense pro-
vides an implicit conceptualization of cinematic subjectivity—let us 
make a short detour, before continuing on to Kador, and point out 
one of the earliest "lms that articulates cinema with hypnotic sug-
gestion. Namely, browsing through the Auguste and Louis Lumière 
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company catalog, one encounters two titles that stand out in their 
singularity: Une Scène d’hypnotisme I and Une Scène d’hypnotisme II, 
two "lms on hypnosis made sometime in 1897–98, the second of 
which presents a woman who is induced into—or at least simulates 
the process of being induced into—a hypnotic state. The woman, 
whom the Lumière catalog identi"es as a certain Mademoiselle 
Lina de Ferkel, stands tensely in front of the camera in a room that 
looks like a painter’s atelier, a large empty painting frame occupy-
ing the left side of the image.26 We see the back of a male "gure, 
supposedly the cameraman or the hypnotist, appear for a brief 
moment until it vanishes off screen, and simultaneously Mademoi-
selle de Ferkel starts to breathe heavily and gesticulate frantically. 
Her body performs a speci"c motor pattern that follows a wavelike 
rhythm until she freezes into immobility, her hands stretched wide 
open in the air in a kind of catalepsy.
Clearly, Une Scène d’hypnotisme, like The Mystery of the Rocks of 
Kador, plays on the exhibitionary and spectacular pull of the body 
that acts out of conscious control, or at least without the interven-
tion of the self. As popular entertainment, the Lumière brothers’ 
piece can be seen as remediating the quasi-scienti"c performances 
on hypnotic subjects common in music halls, vaudeville theaters, 
and also special cabinets at the end of the nineteenth century—
generally speaking the same locations where the culture of cinema 
also developed. Georges Gilles de la Tourette observed in 1887 
that in Paris there were more than "ve hundred cabinets display-
ing somnambulists (cabinets somnambuliques) that capitalized on the 
spectacular effects one was capable of conjuring with hypnotic sug-
gestion.27 However, during this period hypnosis also played the role 
of a new kind of epistemic tool, destabilizing familiar notions of 
individual identity and assumptions about the limits of selfhood. 
Important in the Lumière company’s one-minute hypnotic scene is 
the way in which it connects cinema technology with the model of 
subjectivity that emerged in late-nineteenth-century psychological 
sciences and with experiments on hypnosis in particular—a model, 
as we have seen, that portrays the individual as fundamentally split 
and shaped by phenomena antithetical to Western rationality: 
in!uence without any logical foundation, dissociative disorders, 
engulfment of the self by its outside, mental contagion, and the 
production of an illusory relation with the world.
The person "lmed, Lina de Ferkel, in fact participated in the 
1890s in experiments on hypnotic suggestion conducted by colo-
nel Albert de Rochas, which concerned, among other things, what 
de Rochas called the exteriorization of sensibility, referring to how, 
under certain circumstances, the subject’s sensitivity can start to 
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occupy the uncertain thresholds between the self and the other, 
inside and outside, individual and milieu. De Rochas’s experi-
ments became quite famous, ending up being reported by Pall Mall 
Gazette in the United Kingdom, which described Lina’s remarkable 
hypnotic sensitivity:
When in a [hypnotic] trance her sensibility leaves her body and can be 
localized by the operator in any object he [de Rochas] desires within a few 
feet of her. If this object be pricked or otherwise manipulated, Mlle. Lina 
experiences exactly the same sensation as if the act had been performed 
on her own person, whereas her body while she is in this state is whole 
insensible. . . . On one occasion, the sensibility of Mlle. Lina had been 
transferred to a photographic plate. Various experiments were made, 
and then the subject was brought back, as it was thought, to her normal 
condition. After the lapse of a considerable time Mlle. Lina was suddenly 
seized with shivering, and then with violent sickness. It was found that 
simultaneously with the appearance of these symptoms M. Euer, to whom 
the photographic plate belonged, had immersed it, unknown to the rest 
of the company, and in a dark room in a distant corner of the house, in 
a chemical bath, and was developing it in the usual way—a process which 
had af!icted Mlle. Lina with a sort of sea-sickness.28
Induced in hypnotic trance, Lina de Ferkel thus seemed to lose 
personal experience and become completely immersed in the life 
of inanimate things and beings, her regime of sensibility being 
disseminated into the surroundings while her own body was anes-
thetic. Here it is indeed hard to delineate between the inside and 
the outside and to judge in which case images are subjective and/
or objective, endogenous and/or exogenous.
This (quite likely apocryphal) story resonates with the implicit 
conceptualization of "lm experience that the Lumière company’s 
hypnotic scene puts forward, concerning the perception of space 
the "lm gives rise to in particular. The momentary glimpse of the 
back of a male "gure, which quickly disappears from the frame, 
introduces an uncannily indirect awareness of the felt presence of 
the person that looms off screen—an awareness that entwines the 
spectator into a circuit of virtual in!uence and invisible forces of 
attraction. In this regard, we could understand the Lumière "lm as 
an early experiment with offscreen space, which does not establish 
continuity of action but rather a certain kind of phantom presence, 
the existence of someone who in!uences what I see and cannot see, 
an Other within me who directs my perception and sensibility.
The absent "gure refers to a process of dissociation that is 
potentially involved in "lm spectatorship in general, crystallizing 
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the projected moving image as, quoting Gilles Deleuze quoting 
Jean-Louis Schefer, “a giant in the back of our heads, Cartesian 
diver, dummy or machine, mechanical man without birth who 
brings the world into suspense.”29 In a key passage of his L’Homme 
ordinaire du cinéma, Schefer speculates how the cinema spectator 
gets suspended in the luminous interval between the projector and 
the screen and becomes closed off from the outer world, and how 
this suspension gives rise to a “phantom existence” within the sub-
ject, an “unexpected vampire” or a machinelike giant, who groans, 
laughs, and dreams through the spectator’s body.30 In the cinema, 
it is as though an outsider had suddenly gained possession of my 
body and now sees and feels through me. Understood in this sense, 
"lm viewing comes across as analogous to hypnotic suggestion in 
which circuits of “nervous light” suspend the outside world and 
evoke a realm of endogenous apparitions, the luminous vibrations 
of the silver screen converging with hypnosis as a speci"c kind of 
technology for the “production of reality,” as Léon Chertok and 
Isabelle Stengers characterize hypnosis, which according to them, 
comes before “reality is linked to the problems of truth and illu-
sion, of test, of submission and denial.”31
Modulated Memories
It is this kind of production of reality that also informs the use 
of cinema for therapeutic suggestion in The Mystery of the Rocks 
of Kador. In Kador, however, the luminous vibrations of the silver 
screen realize the replacement and decomposition of memory in 
addition to sensibility. In the process of curing Suzanne, a hyp-
notic-like circuit of nervous light that is established between the 
cinema screen and the spectator opens up the subject’s intimate 
memory for modi"cation, reminding one of Freud confessing in 
1897 how “to this day I cannot understand how it can be supposed 
that by merely holding up a "nger and saying once ‘go to sleep’ 
I had created in the patient the peculiar psychical state in which 
her memory had access to all her psychical experiences.”32 How-
ever, the curious point about Kador is that Suzanne herself never 
actually witnessed the events that took place on the shore, as she 
was passed out during the entire incident. What she is suffering 
from is not traumatic memories per se but traumatic forgetting; 
it is the absence of memories and thus the incapacity of forget-
ting (those memories) that seems to provoke Suzanne’s illness. In 
this context, Professor Williams’s method is not to uncover exist-
ing (but concealed) memories but to implant new ones by means 
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of cinematography—and ostensibly thereby to induce the inter-
twined processes of remembering and forgetting, which, to quote 
the words of Ribot again, are “a condition of health and life.”
To emphasize, in Kador, the circuit between the screen and 
the soul established by the hypnotic-like play of light and shadow 
is meant to create new memories, new pasts. The picture of mem-
ory the "lm draws is hence somewhat different from the one often 
associated with modernity whereby memory gets understood 
through the metaphors of inscription, mark, or trace.33 Freud, for 
one, at one point compared the unconscious, or memory, with a 
storage space where nothing could be erased, but memory traces 
existed, like archaeological facts, outside time and destruction, 
reiterating thus what could be called an archival understanding 
of memory as a faculty of storing and retrieving remembrances 
common in the nineteenth century.34 Even if fantasies, as Freud 
observed in his 1899 article “Screen Memories,” come to trans-
form memories we have from early childhood in particular, there 
must nonetheless be “a memory-trace the content of which offers 
the phantasy a point of contact.”35 Even if the psyche twists and 
distorts so as to let repressed material emerge in consciousness, 
there must be an originary scene the contents of which remain 
unchanged and consequently the truthfulness of which cannot be 
doubted.36
In Kador, by contrast, memory is displayed as something pro-
tean and organic in the sense that it appears as open to constant 
modi"cations and adaptations, even complete erasure. In this 
regard, Professor Williams’s approach closely parallels Janet’s use 
of hypnosis as a therapeutic and experimental technology for the 
modulation of memory. In Janet’s hands, hypnosis not only dis-
closed concealed past events but, more importantly, made it pos-
sible to act upon the past, to redraw the traces that the past had 
inscribed on the individual. To take an example, in L’Automatisme 
psychologique from 1889, Janet recounted the case history of Marie, 
who suffered, among many other ailments, from blindness in the 
left eye.37 This blindness was not of a purely physiological nature, 
which was evidenced by the fact that when Janet transported Marie 
back to the age of "ve by means of hypnosis, she would resume the 
sensibility she had at this age, being able to see very well with both 
of her eyes.38 As a result, Janet reasoned that the blindness must be 
of psychological origin and have started at some point when Marie 
was six years old. To probe further into the origins of the illness, 
he induced Marie into somnambulism (a deep state of hypnosis) 
and made her relive the principal moments of her life at that age, 
discovering during the process the following “pointless,” as Janet 
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called it, but traumatic event: despite her cries, Marie was made to 
sleep next to a child who had impetigo mainly on the left side of 
her face. From that moment, Marie became anesthetic on the left 
side of her face and lost sight from her left eye.
Janet described Marie’s case as interesting in that it demon-
strated the “importance of subconscious "xed ideas and the role 
they play in certain physical illness as well as in moral illness,” sug-
gesting also how “subconscious life” acted in an intellectual and 
coordinated fashion.39 Janet saw that "xed ideas generally devel-
oped as the result of accidents of a traumatic nature and could 
even take complete control over the psyche in dreams and som-
nambulistic states. He de"ned them as uni"ed groups of emo-
tionally charged, pathogenic mental images, which had become 
isolated from conscious personality—that is to say, they were amne-
siac and automatic—and which could keep repeating themselves 
inde"nitely and transform themselves into hallucinations and 
involuntary bodily movements.40 It is worth paying attention to 
Janet’s vocabulary here: for Janet, the subject became contingent 
upon the work of images, the image understood as the form under 
which past sensations are reproduced in memory.41 Furthermore, 
this visually imbued conceptual framework, as we will see shortly, 
provided (similarly to Bernheim’s notions of nervous light and ani-
mated images) an implicit conceptualization of cinema as a speci"c 
kind of memoropolitical technology.
But what did Janet do to cure Marie? How could one gain com-
mand of the "xed ideas or groups of !xed images—forgotten, trau-
matic memories—that acted out of conscious control and produced 
all sorts of pathological phenomena, from dissociation to anesthe-
sia? Janet’s approach was by means of hypnotic suggestion to take 
Marie back to the past traumatic event and to replace her memories 
with new ones. The psychologist made the patient believe that the 
child sleeping next to her was “very kind,” compelled her to caress 
the child’s face, and led her to infer that she had no impetigo, after 
all. After a few sessions, Marie actually regained sight in her left 
eye. Janet’s method thus, by means of hypnosis, rendered the past 
as contingent, something that is not "xed and determinate but is 
open to modi"cations. Instead of searching for traces and truths in 
the past, Janet’s pragmatic approach was to erase those memories 
that turned out to be pathogenic and to create and implement new 
ones, to create a new past for the patient.
Another case study from an article published in 1894 dem-
onstrates the process vividly.42 This was about the case of Justine, 
who suffered from a curious fear of cholera and dying and was, in 
Janet’s words, “occupied by numerous and varying images that are 
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grouped together so as to form a fully uni"ed picture [tableau].”43 
These images encompassed corpses bearing the marks of the dis-
ease, one of which in particular was “visible on the foreground, ‘a 
completely naked poor old man, green and blue,’” as well as odors 
of decaying corpses, the tolling of bells and cries of cholera, or 
even cramps, cries, and vomiting of the victims that Justine had 
witnessed and that she also reproduced in the hysterical crisis. In 
this case, too, Janet’s method was by means of hypnotic suggestion 
to modify and replace the traumatic memories—a method that 
he described in terms of the decomposition and substitution of 
images.44 Over the course of several sessions, the naked corpses 
were provided with clothes, the particularly troubling green-and-
blue corpse of an old man being given the costume of a Chinese 
general whom Justine had previously seen at a Universal Exposi-
tion. The success was “complete,” to an extent at least, when Janet 
managed to make the Chinese general stand up and walk.
In his psychotherapeutic practice, Janet worked like a "lm 
director, or editor, who created new scenarios by decomposing 
scenes from the past into separate elements and by substituting 
these with other previous memory images, or with completely new 
and fabricated ones. All of a sudden, the naked become clothed, 
and dead bodies become alive again. The allusion here to the 
magic of cinema is striking—suf"ce to think of Georges Méliès’s 
story about how he invented the stop-motion substitution trick 
when his camera jammed and he was able to continue "lming only 
after a lapse of time: when the "lm was projected, a Madeleine-Bas-
tille trolley suddenly changed into a hearse and men changed into 
women.45 In his recent work, Raymond Bellour has compellingly 
shown how the “dispositifs” of cinema and hypnosis correspond to 
one another closely, especially in terms of the power they share to 
“con"gure the world,” which is a power to produce endogenous 
apparitions and imaginations.46 In Janet’s case, this power meant 
the power to make one forget by implanting memories of events 
that had never taken place. In the case of Kador, it seems that this 
power also means the power of making one forget; however, at this 
time, making one forget forgetfulness itself by implanting memo-
ries that the subject effectively never had. As noted, the "lm that 
Professor Williams produces is not meant to af"rm the existence 
of hidden memories and to reveal them to the therapist as well as 
the patient. Instead, what Suzanne is made to watch is something 
she cannot remember, and the white screen she confronts when 
the "lm ends and before which she recoils and passes out should 
in this sense be considered, fundamentally, a screen of forgetting 
(see "gure 1a).
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In both Janet and Kador, we are dealing with the power to pro-
duce the real by creating new pasts for the subject, quite like the 
“power of the false” that Deleuze describes in Cinema 2, where he 
discusses a modality of cinematic expression and narration of time 
that ceases to claim to be true and is operated by “a power of the 
false which replaces and supersedes the form of the true, because it 
poses . . . the co-existence of not-necessarily true pasts.”47 Here, the 
question of cinema hinges on the impossibility of distinguishing 
the objective from the subjective, the external world from subjec-
tive interiority, or as Deleuze puts it, quoting Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
Twilight of the Idols (1889), “With the real world we have also abol-
ished the apparent world.”48 The cinematic image unmasks itself as 
incapable of letting us decide between what actually happened and 
what did not happen. In this respect, it is not possessed by any “will 
to truth” but a speci"c kind of “will to power,” which is the cinema’s 
power to modify memory by fabulating the past, to produce reality 
by animating imagination, and thus to recon"gure the world in 
which the subject lives.
* * *
What does The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador compel us to think about 
cinema? First of all, in its self-re!ective mode, Kador situates cinema 
within the context of the sciences of memory that emerged during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century and came up with a model 
of subjectivity that conceptualized the individual as porous, acci-
dental, prone to continuous modulations, and predicated above 
all on the fundamental capacity to forget. Memory, like the indi-
vidual, became something uncertain, suggestible, and malleable. 
Secondly, the way in which Kador articulates the power that cinema 
is able to exercise over its spectators draws precisely on the idea of 
modulating individual capacities of remembering and forgetting, 
the contingent textures of memory that make up the soul and pro-
vide the key to its pathologies. Here, the technology of cinema par-
allels with hypnosis, which by the turn of the twentieth century had 
become a technique for disclosing forgotten, traumatic pasts and 
acting on these pasts by making one forget and implementing false 
memories. This is the most radical argument Kador puts forward: 
that cinematic images amount to new descriptions of the past, and 
that we go to the cinema to forget. Like hypnosis, cinema renders 
our subjective pasts as indeterminate. Cinema’s memoropolitical 
power lies in the way in which it, paraphrasing Hacking, is able 
to make us experience now, in memory, something that did not 
exist before.49 Cinema, in other words, is capable of revising our 
Cinema’s Memoropolitics 339
subjective pasts retroactively. The white screen in Kador should 
indeed be considered an emblem of this capacity the cinema has 
to make us forget.
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